What is a proposed “League of Democracies”? It has been initially proposed by various commentators in the early 2000s as a UN replacement, UN subgroup, supranational federation, and a collective security agreement. Most recently, these ideas have been synthesized into a book by John Davenport, who is now the leading advocate of this proposed democratic organization. Davenport focuses on a more fixed federation and army rather than other proposals. His inflexible league of democracies is not an effective method to combat revisionist powers. Instead, the UK’s “coalition of the willing” forms a better model to support democracies.
First, several nations that are considered democracies (in terms of elections and civil rights) do not participate in global institutions to aid democracies. For example, while the U.S. is still democratic, under Trump it has taken an increasingly pro-Russian stance. In contrast, the more authoritarian Turkey has recently taken a harder line in favor of Ukraine. The fundamental flaw with this coalition is that it is based on democratic membership; however its goal is to democratic countries against authoritarian powers. There is a mismatch between the goal and effect. If we want to help Ukraine, we should create a group of pro-Ukrainian countries instead of democracies. With the unfortunate rise of populism in both the Americas and Europe, many democracies are not reliable supporters of the international democratic order.
Second, Davenport’s League of Democracies already exists in a regional form. The European Union (EU) is already a binding supranational government with a legislature, executive, volunteer standing quasi-army and recovery and reconstruction funds. While the EU has been remarkably successful in many of its goals, it has proven quite weak in areas of foreign policy. With long-running differences in defense policy between France, Germany and Poland, the EU has failed to effectively coordinate a unified military force. Instead, that has been the area of the more flexible and optional North American Treaty Organization (NATO), which creates a framework that allows for, but does not require, security cooperation. The problem with the EU is the unilateral veto on areas of defense. This allows for skeptic countries like Poland and Hungary to block progression of a common EU defense policy. Additionally, the EU lacks important actors that support the democratic system, including the United Kingdom and the United States that are vitally important to aiding other democracies. The EU’s weakness and limited membership of democratic actors are likely to be replicated in any new league of democracy.
In order to help Ukraine, Taiwan, Syria and other vulnerable democracies, we should focus on those who want to help the countries rather than democratic countries. Some nominally democratic countries, such Israel, are actively destabilizing the region. On the other hand, some non-democratic states, including many in the Persian Gulf, have been supportive of the new democratic future of Syria. To be most effective at supporting democratic countries, their supporting organizations should focus on those with an interest in supporting that democratic actor, whether those interests are values-based or realpolitik. With the rising power of authoritarian states, democracies cannot afford to look gift horses in the mouth. We can also not afford vital coalitions to be gummed up by a few states, merely because those countries hold elections. To support Ukraine, for example, it is only rational to create a group of Ukrainian supporters, rather than democracies. While this wouldn’t be a problem if the latter two groups were the same, there are less than democratic supporters of Ukraine, such as Turkey and Rwanda and democracies that don’t support Ukraine, such as the current United States. This flexible group would be able to survive an uncooperative member without stalling. This tension is apparent even in Davenport’s own writings: his categories for inclusion are extremely vague, and still includes the less than democratic Narendra Modi (probably because of India’s great importance in countering a rising, authoritarian China).
What is the alternative for democratic support for defense of democratic countries? The UK’s recent “coalition of the willing” provides an excellent example. Instead of a binding, bureaucratic governmental system that prioritizes consensus, this coalition would work towards a common purpose without requiring binding unanimity or a restrictive entry criteria. It aligns the goals of participants with the goals of the organization: to aid Ukraine. We can also reform existing international frameworks that create consensus by self-selection instead of by mandate. A good example here is NATO’s reform for more optional military deployments, known as the Framework Nations Concept.
Now is the time in which democracies need to step up. The post-war Liberal International Order is crumbling. Inflation has led to a backlash against incumbent parties worldwide, empowering populism. At the same time, anti-democratic actors in Moscow and Beijing are growing in capability and boldness. We need flexible, fast-acting groups to combat this rise of violent authoritarians. In order to do so, we should embrace flexible and informal models of organizing around democracy, rather than a repeat of the stagnant and bureaucratic organizations that are currently failing to combat global authoritarianism.
