While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been rapidly expanding its military capabilities through both technological integration and increased economic investment, corruption continues to pose a significant threat to the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve the goals set out for it by the PRC’s President, Xi Jingping.
Since coming to power, Xi has made fighting corruption one of his signature policies. His motivations are both objective and personal. Corruption was a real problem in China when Xi rose to power: it undermined internal party stability and popularity, along with generally being corrosive to effectiveness and good governance.
However, the anti-corruption campaign has also helped Xi centralize power in the national government, build his own cult of personality, and purge political rivals. It is telling that Xi has strengthened party institutions rather than create true anti-corruption measures such as an independent and transparent judiciary or an independent corruption commission. This supports the view that the purge is more driven to support Xi’s objectives rather than a true all-in effort against corruption.
Having a signature policy program also boosts Xi’s personal mythos. A telling parallel can be made to Mao Zedong, who also implemented his signature policy, the Cultural Revolution, to centralize power in himself and cement his legacy. This approach allows Xi to go after the easy (and easily faked) target of corruption rather than trying to implement more significant reforms to the huji system to close the rural-urban divide, or sustain China’s post-Deng economic growth. While Xi’s intentions are murky, the effect is clear. China’s dedication to fighting corruption does include symbolic actions. But it also involves dedicating a Politburo Standing Committee member and purging former allies.
While corruption exists throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, a particular focus has been on the military forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). One particular case study in Chinese military corruption is in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which is responsible for China’s conventional and nuclear missiles. Despite decades of anti-corruption work, corruption in the PLARF has resulted in fuel and silo mishaps that seriously impede or even eliminate capabilities for the missile force. One anecdote reported in Bloomberg even includes waterlogged missiles.
Even if the actual graft within the Rocket Force have been solved by recent purges and heightened scrutiny, it might raise serious doubts in Chinese decisionmakers about the capabilities of their military forces to actually succeed in a conventional war with the United States, especially when those decisionmakers may already have doubt in the ability of the untested PLA to operate in real combat or survive organizational degradation. And even the purges, which went after a bevy of low-level officials as well as top military and defense contractors, while likely necessary, may take time to change the deep rot in the force, and would therefore delay a potential Indo-Pacific conflict.
It is also notable that corruption in the PLARF was openly acknowledged, as the very point of the Rocket Force’s nuclear capability is to maintain a credible deterrent. Graft at the level alleged in the PLARF, even if false, can undermine the mission. Explicitly describing corruption in the PLARF, even if the actual capabilities improve, impedes the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, the entire point of a (very expensive) nuclear arsenal. These reputational costs to the purge also suggest that Xi’s willingness to implement the purge is based on a genuine concern about corruption in the military rather than playing politics.
The implication is that Xi cares about his military’s ability to fight rather than just be a paper tiger, which is inconsistent with a Chinese military which does not seek to actually fight in the next couple decades. This is further evidence by the expansion of the purge to more than the PLARF.
The rot in the Chinese military runs deeper than just the PLARF, and continues to demand embarrassing purges. However, the most recent purges have been particularly relevant because they include personal appointees of Xi. One of them, Miao, exemplifies the extent of corruption. Not only was the purged official the head of promotions and ensuring loyalty in the PLA, but also was brought in to replace a corrupt official himself. This suggests how Xi does not have reliable deputies that he can put into these positions. The truth is that, even the removal of Miao, who is in one of the perfect spots to spread graft throughout the organization, may not be sufficient to restore the capabilities of and trust in the PLA.
With these short-term disruptions, China may not be able to exploit America’s newfound lack of commitment to Taiwan or the potential chaos of a 2028 transfer of power. While some commentators have argued that military purges merely serve the same legitimacy function of nonmilitary purges, this does not discount the negative effects of the purges themself on the military readiness of the PLA. These continental purges do not have a clear end point, with past shakeups apparently failing to combat entrenched corruption.
These purges will have a significant impact on the military readiness of the PRC. While recent corruption revelations have focused on higher-ups, graft is still likely to denigrate the effectiveness from General to Private. Corruption can impede command-and-control, a lasting weakness of the PLA. Revelations of graft by top leaders can also lead to a broader culture of rot in the rank and file. The removal of specific generals, such as one of the head planners for a Taiwanese invasion, also demonstrates capability gaps in specific and crucial areas. The end result is a delay in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict between China and the United States. Given the U.S.’s recent investments in medium-term capabilities, the purges also potentially limit Xi’s strategic flexibility and relative capabilities in any future territorial expansions, as China’s ideal window for a Taiwan invasion is slipping out of their hands.
This informs several recommendations for U.S. policymakers. First, a short-term conflict is unlikely as long as a minimum of deterrence is maintained. However, Xi’s willingness to accept reputational damage in order to improve the military implies that a long-term conflict is likely inevitable unless either side is willing to concede important strategic interests and the claim to global superiority. Therefore, U.S. defense procurements can be focused on “fight tomorrow” weapons like NGAD and investments in supply chains rather than “fight today” investments like maintaining the Booker. Second, corruption has implicated Xi’s trust in his military, and purges have undermined morale. This provides openings for intelligence assets to cultivate networks in order to exploit and widen the civil-military divide. Third, the U.S. should focus on capabilities that can leverage the brittle nature of institutional corruption, such as offensive systems which can disrupt PLA command, control and communication, or small-unit tactics that test the competence of Chinese NCOs.
